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Introduction 
 
 
EU Economic Partnership Agreements in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Avenues of Compromise for a Constructive Outcome by September 2014 
Evita Schmieg 
For more than ten years the European Union has been negotiating economic partner-
ship agreements (EPAs) with regional groupings in Africa. These free trade agreements 
are dedicated first and foremost to the goal of sustainable development. While African 
governments are wary of the consequences of market opening and sceptical of restric-
tions of their policy space, they are also interested in gaining access to the EU market. 
The European Union’s decision to restrict free market access as of 1 October 2014 to coun-
tries and regions that exhibit a clear intention to ratify such agreements has injected 
pressure and momentum into the talks. The negotiations can be concluded construc-
tively if both sides accept necessary compromises. That demands movement, not least 
at the very top. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 specified 
that EPAs were to be concluded between 
the European Union and regions in Africa. 
They were to succeed the decades-old non-
reciprocal tariff preferences that the Euro-
pean Union had granted to former colonies 
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP), which became incompatible with 
world trade rules when the World Trade 
Organisation’s waiver expired in 2007. The 
objective of the EPAs is to bring the Euro-
pean Union’s trade relations with the ACP 
states into line with WTO rules while pre-
serving trade preferences for these states. 
Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement demands 
that the EPAs should contribute to sustain-
able development of the ACP states and to 
their integration in the global economy. 
Current State of Play 
Only one comprehensive regional EPA has 
to date been concluded, with the Carib-
bean in 2007. Negotiations with the African 
regions are turning out to be tough. The 
WTO rules on free trade areas demand that 
ACP states joining the EPAs must also open 
their markets to the European Union to 
a certain extent. But African governments 
fear that the ensuing import competition 
from the European Union would incur eco-
nomic adjustment costs. The thirty least de-
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 veloped countries (LDCs) in the EPA regions 
possess little incentive to participate in 
the agreements because they already enjoy 
access to the “Everything-But-Arms” scheme 
of the Union’s Generalised System of Pref-
erences. An interest in participating in 
an EPA only arises for them if they use 
liberalisation steps associated with an EPA 
to leverage economic reforms and seek to 
create a better basis for developing regional 
integration. 
The EPA talks had very different effects 
on regional integration in Africa. In certain 
cases they accelerated regional integration 
processes, where simply thinking about 
the regional negotiating configurations 
has promoted clarification processes and 
spurred the dynamic in eastern and south-
ern Africa. In ECOWAS (Economic Commu-
nity of West African States) the EPA talks 
provided an incentive to finally adopt 
the common external tariff. In the Carib-
bean the talks strengthened cooperation 
between the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic, 
which then jointly signed the EPA as 
CARIFORUM (Caribbean Forum). 
In order to achieve free market access 
various states and regions in 2007 initialled 
twenty-one subregional or bilateral interim 
trade agreements, in the scope of which 
the European Union completely opened its 
goods markets. However, to date interim 
agreements have been signed and ratified 
only by certain ACP states. In the meantime 
negotiations continued with the goal of 
concluding comprehensive regional agree-
ments. One interest of certain ACP states 
here was to alter particular aspects of the 
interim agreements. In the meantime six 
years have passed and the texts have been 
technically largely finalised. Now political 
decisions are demanded. In this situation 
the European Union has set a new deadline. 
After a transition phase lasting until 1 Octo-
ber 2014 free market access will be with-
drawn from all countries that fail to dem-
onstrate a real intention to sign and ratify. 
Tariffs could then increase for Botswana, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya, Camer-
oon, Namibia and Swaziland. According to 
the EU-Africa Chamber of Commerce this 
could have serious repercussions on indi-
vidual countries and products (for example, 
tariffs of 23 to 24 percent on cut flowers 
from Kenya would be introduced). The im-
minent threat of losing free market access 
has given new impetus to the negotiations. 
But a number of critical political sticking 
points still need to be cracked, probably at 
the ministerial level, before comprehensive 
regional agreements can be concluded. We 
will now examine these points in greater 
detail and identify possible avenues of com-
promise. 
A Changed Setting for 
EU-ACP Relations 
The present political context for negotia-
tions with Africa is considerably different 
from the situation in 1996, when the Green 
Paper on Relations between the European Union 
and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Cen-
tury was published. The green paper also 
set the scene for a reorientation of trade 
cooperation after decades of non-reciprocal 
preferences. Many African countries have 
recorded high rates of growth in the inter-
im. Their trade dependency on the Euro-
pean Union, which was still very strong in 
the 1980s, has declined rapidly, with the 
Union’s share of their foreign trade falling 
to about 23 percent today. But the Euro-
pean Union has changed greatly too. The 
newer member-states have no colonial 
past and are free of any associated sense 
of political obligation. Moreover, some of 
them even have incomes that are lower than 
those of certain ACP countries, for example 
in the Caribbean: in 2012 per capita in-
come in Hungary was $12,622, in Barbados 
$14,917 (World Bank data). This state of 
affairs does not exactly promote a willing-
ness to maintain the Union’s historically 
rooted special treatment of the ACP states. 
Both the European Union and the ACP 
states must therefore ask themselves what 
value they attribute to cooperation under 
changing political and economic conditions. 
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 One important point in this connection 
is progress on African regional integration. 
In 2012 intra-ACP trade reached 11.5 per-
cent of overall trade. While that is admit-
tedly not enormous, the share has grown 
rapidly. And regional integration is high 
on the agenda of African governments. The 
question of whether EPAs promote regional 
integration processes (and whether long-
term provisional arrangements like the 
interim agreements impede them) needs 
to be thoroughly thought through. 
Bilateral interim agreements are not 
a problem as long as the participating 
regional integration communities are 
nothing more than free trade areas. But if 
internal integration is to go further, towards 
a customs union (with free internal move-
ment of goods and a common external 
tariff) the situation is different. The exter-
nal tariffs would in principle already be 
defined by the EU agreement, the leeway 
for talks about the region’s common exter-
nal tariff smaller, and consensus therefore 
harder to achieve. But this problem is not 
of equal practical relevance in every case, as 
regional integration is often still rudimen-
tary. Customs controls are occasioned not 
only by different levels of tariffs, but also 
by sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 
On top of this come heavy administrative 
burdens. This applies even within the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
The external trade rules introduced by the 
EPAs presently represent merely an addi-
tional complication at these borders. And 
it can be assumed that over time different 
tariff rates vis-à-vis the European Union 
will also become less important. Multi-
lateral liberalisations and liberalisation 
within larger regional communities might 
sometime surpass the EPA tariffs. For the 
moment they obstruct the way there. 
Problem Areas in the Negotiations 
1.  Export taxes on raw materials. The Euro-
pean Union demands the abolition of ex-
port taxes on raw materials. Although the 
contested passages of the draft agreements 
permit ACP partners to apply export taxes 
for particular reasons, for example in order 
to develop domestic value chains, the rele-
vant decision would be made by a joint 
body, the joint EPA Council. Export taxes 
play an important role in certain African 
countries; the establishment of the Namib-
ian leather industry after independence, 
for example, was promoted by a combina-
tion of industrial policy and export taxes. 
African politicians therefore regard an 
arrangement that takes the decision out 
of the hands of national government as a 
restriction of their policy space and con-
sequently reject it. Moreover, export taxes 
are not prohibited under WTO rules. To 
that extent the African ACP countries point 
out that the WTO is the right place to nego-
tiate about export taxes. Here they echo 
the European Union’s position on internal 
support for agriculture, which it wishes to 
negotiate only under the WTO framework 
and not in EPAs. The ACP countries have 
thus shrewdly linked the two topics, in full 
knowledge that it would be out of the ques-
tion for the European Union to negotiate 
aspects of its Common Agricultural Policy 
in the EPA framework. 
2.  Market opening by the ACP states. The 
European Commission has insisted since 
the start of the talks that the ACP side liber-
alise 80 percent of its imports. That would 
achieve the average 90 percent liberalisa-
tion (EU: 100 percent, ACP: 80 percent) that 
is required to legitimise a free trade area 
under WTO rules. That, however, is only the 
European Union’s interpretation. The WTO 
has in fact yet to spell out the criteria for a 
free trade area. The relevant article XXIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
demands a liberalisation of “substantially 
all the trade” within a reasonable period. 
According to the European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 
a liberalisation of 70 percent over a period 
of fifteen to twenty years is widely regarded 
as reasonable. 
The ECOWAS region in particular wit-
nesses energetic wrangling over the extent 
of market opening. The political and eco-
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 nomic situation in this region is extremely 
complex. The largest country, Nigeria, is 
not really interested in an EPA because of 
its export structure – primarily oil and oil 
products that are already exported duty-
free to the European Union. Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire, also not LDCs, on the other 
hand have a real interest in gaining free 
access to the EU market and have therefore 
already concluded interim EPAs. Other 
countries in the region, like Mali (which 
currently has other worries) are LDCs and 
therefore not dependent on an EPA for 
free market access. In this situation, the 
ECOWAS members agreed in October 2013 
on a common external tariff and increased 
their offer on liberalisation of trade to 75 
percent. Through these great efforts the 
region is taking steps towards the European 
Union in order to lay the groundwork for a 
regional EPA. At the same time it wishes to 
prevent the interim agreements becoming 
permanent and impeding regional inte-
gration processes. 
3.  The most-favoured-nation clause. In 
the interests of development it is of funda-
mental importance that the agreements 
are asymmetrical. The European Union has 
abolished all tariffs under the CARIFORUM 
and interim EPAs, in other words liberalis-
ing much more extensively than the ACP. 
But in return the European Union demands 
that its ACP partners do not discriminate 
against it in trade policy by treating it less 
favourably than other large countries (the 
most-favoured-nation clause). The African 
ACP countries fear that this would narrow 
their policy space and burden possible 
later free trade talks with other regions or 
countries (such as Brazil). The CARIFORUM 
EPA, on the other hand, contains a most-
favoured-nation clause that even after im-
plementation is regarded as unproblematic 
in the region. 
4.  Sustainability and the non-execution 
clause. The non-execution clause permits 
treaty obligations to be suspended in the 
event of serious human rights violations. 
Such violations in a treaty state could be 
punished by the withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences. A similar provision in the Lomé Con-
vention was used twice (Zimbabwe 2001, 
Fiji 2007) but in those cases affected devel-
opment cooperation rather than trade 
preferences. The ACP states reject the non-
execution clause on the basis that political 
concerns should have no influence on trade 
relations. In civil society the clause is con-
tested. Human rights organisations be-
lieve it to be helpful and generally demand 
a strict linkage between human rights 
clauses and the operative provisions of 
trade agreements; from their perspective 
import restrictions in response to human 
rights violations are desirable. NGOs 
concerned with trade, on the other hand, 
reject the non-execution clause. 
5.  Additionality of EPA-related aid for 
trade. The African ACP states demand addi-
tional funds (“additionality”) for trade-
related projects. Experience has shown that 
liberalisation does not automatically lead 
to rising exports and economic diversifica-
tion. Trade-related development initiatives 
(or Aid for Trade, AfT) are intended to sup-
port these countries in conducting success-
ful trade negotiations, implementing their 
results, expanding their supply capacities 
and thus improving their market opportu-
nities. In the scope of the EPA negotiations 
the need for flanking development initia-
tives was comprehensively analysed for 
certain cases (for example for ECOWAS). 
But the European Union does not accept 
the necessity of promising further funds 
because for decades the EU funds for devel-
opment cooperation provided through the 
European Development Fund have not been 
fully taken up; money is fundamentally 
available. However, EU development policy 
is widely felt to be administratively com-
plex, and its processes protracted and 
complicated. Thus implementation prob-
lems cannot be attributed solely to a lack 
of “absorption capacity” in target countries; 
there is without doubt a need for reform 
on the part of the European Union. 
6.  Regional integration in southern 
Africa. Interests within southern Africa 
diverge very widely, which makes the nego-
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 tiating situation particularly complicated. 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozam-
bique are all explicitly interested in a 
comprehensive regional EPA and have all 
(together with Namibia) already signed – 
but not ratified – an interim agreement. 
Namibia, Angola and South Africa tend to 
be critical of the negotiations. While 
Angola already enjoys zero-tariff access 
to the EU market as an LDC, Namibia has 
important exports (above all beef) that 
would be at risk without an EPA. Further 
complicating the situation, South Africa 
already signed a trade and partnership 
agreement with the European Union 
in 1999 (amended 2009). South Africa 
demands equal treatment with the other 
members of the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC). But the 
European Union has made it clear that it 
cannot grant free market access because 
South Africa’s economy demonstrates such 
a high level of development that it should 
be counted as one of the dynamic emerging 
economies rather than as a developing 
country. So South Africa’s economic incen-
tive to join an EPA is small. Yet negotia-
tions without South Africa are impossible, 
because it forms a customs union together 
with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland. So South Africa is automatically 
involved in the EPA through the common 
external tariff, and also has an interest in 
asserting its position within SACU and pro-
tecting its economic and political hegem-
ony in the region. On the other hand, some 
of its neighbours have an interest in reduc-
ing their dependency. That explains, for 
example, the diverging positions in south-
ern Africa on whether topics such as 
services and investment should also come 
under the scope of the EPA. 
Options for Action 
Negotiations are currently continuing 
with the aim of concluding comprehensive 
regional economic partnership agreements 
by October 2014. Various alternatives for 
the eventuality that the talks fail to pro-
duce successful outcomes in all regions 
have been discussed in public (whereas 
the EU and the ACP are concentrating for 
the time being on the ongoing talks): 
1.  Status quo: One possibility for the 
interested non-LDC ACP countries would be 
to sign and ratify bilateral interim agree-
ments (possibly in amended form), but 
without pursuing further negotiations. 
That would secure them their free market 
access. This option would, however, have 
two important drawbacks. Firstly, interim 
agreements with individual countries could 
impede further regional integration within 
the ACP regions. Secondly, the ACP could 
waste an opportunity to leverage the EPAs 
to initiate a process of deepening integra-
tion and thereby contribute to dynamic 
development. 
2.  No agreement (reversion to the Gen-
eralised System of Preferences): Although 
this possibility is rarely discussed it should 
nonetheless be considered. In view of 
their reduced dependency on the Euro-
pean Union the still wavering ACP coun-
tries should evaluate whether concluding 
an EPA really matches their interests. If 
they rejected an EPA they would not have 
to open their markets to the European 
Union and the regional integration pro-
cesses could proceed according to their own 
internal rhythm. This could also be a draw-
back: If the pressure of the EPA negotiations is 
removed, the incentive to push internal inte-
gration also vanishes. The main problem 
would be that the non-LDC ACP countries 
would lose their free access to the EU mar-
ket. This would cause difficulties for indi-
vidual sectors in the ACP states. The ACP 
regions would have to deal actively with 
adjustment problems, promote competi-
tiveness in relevant sectors, diversify their 
economies and strengthen social security 
systems. In all these areas development 
policy could play a supporting role. 
3.  A new WTO waiver: Theoretically it 
would be possible to ask the WTO partners 
to approve another waiver for trade prefer-
ences for the ACP. Except: Four decades 
of non-reciprocal EU trade preferences for 
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 Africa were not able to diversify the African 
economies. Their already small share of 
the European Union’s external trade fell 
further over this period. But what is most 
problematic is that WTO trade partners, 
especially the developing countries of Latin 
America and Asia, would only approve a 
waiver if they were granted other trade 
privileges of their own. Why, for example, 
should Guatemala accept Madagascar 
receiving better conditions for access to 
the EU market? But compensation would 
significantly reduce the economic value 
of the waiver. 
4.  The OECD states grant developing 
countries zero-tariff status, if they agree to 
regional trade liberalisation amongst them-
selves, which in the case of the African 
Union means liberalisation within Africa 
as a whole. This would provide an incentive 
for regional integration, but the proposal 
is associated with numerous problems. 
Firstly, like the waiver option discussed 
above, it ignores a fundamental develop-
ment problem: granting non-reciprocal 
preferences has not so far succeeded in 
initiating dynamic development processes. 
The proposal is also problematic in relation 
to the WTO rules, under which non-recipro-
cal special treatment is permitted for the 
poorest countries, but not for those with 
higher incomes. That is precisely why the 
EPAs are being negotiated. The principle 
of non-discrimination also prohibits any 
preference scheme being regionally re-
stricted to Africa. Furthermore, the pro-
posal is politically unrealistic. Firstly, pan-
African integration is far from being so 
advanced as to fulfil the WTO conditions 
for such preferences. Secondly, certain 
OECD states are unwilling to open their 
markets non-reciprocally for middle-in-
come countries (including African), and 
instead expect a quid pro quo. This became 
apparent at the 2005 WTO ministerial con-
ference in Hong Kong, where WTO mem-
bers were not even able to agree to grant 
the poorest countries (LDCs) fully duty- and 
quota-free market access. This proposal is 
thus no alternative to the EPA negotiations. 
Possible Avenues of Compromise 
If a constructive outcome is to be achieved, 
both sides must relinquish rigid stances. 
The search for possible compromises 
should be guided by the following consid-
erations. 
 
The European Union should recognise the special 
situation of the poor and poorest countries; devel-
opment is the uppermost objective. Sustainable 
development is anchored as the priority 
objective of the EPAs in the Cotonou Agree-
ment; the European Union should base its 
positions on that. One issue where this 
applies is the demand to abolish export 
taxes on raw materials. In the case of export 
taxes levied for development reasons the 
European Union should put any self-inter-
est of its own to one side and demonstrate 
flexibility. This can be reflected at various 
points in the agreement. If the European 
Union does not wish to remain complete-
ly silent on export taxes (which can be 
assumed), their sphere of application could 
be defined in broad terms (for example for 
state revenue, to increase value added, to 
anchor social and environmental aspects). 
And it would be possible to define the con-
ditions for their introduction less strictly. 
For example the role of the joint EPA coun-
cil could be consultative, without decision-
making powers, or it could be bypassed 
altogether. Such flexible arrangements 
would allow the ACP states greater policy 
leeway and give them the possibility to 
introduce new export taxes in the interests 
of national development. 
The extent of market opening by the 
ACP states is the second point in which the 
European Union should accommodate the 
development interests of its partners. The 
European Union should recognise that 
ECOWAS, for example, has moved a long 
way since the talks began. It should accept 
the offer of 75 percent market opening and 
cease insisting on its own 80 percent figure. 
 
The African ACP states should not overstretch their 
claim to special treatment. The ACP countries 
in turn should recognise that the European 
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 Union, in offering completely free market 
access, has gone a big step further than the 
former non-reciprocal trade preferences. 
They should therefore also agree to compro-
mises on the most-favoured-nation clause. 
Rejecting it would be tantamount to de-
manding permanent special treatment, and 
that would only be comprehensible if these 
countries permanently retained their LDC 
status. Fortunately it is foreseeable that this 
will not be the case. 
 
The ACP should accept that free trade agreements 
cannot ignore human rights and sustainability. 
The possibilities for compromise here lie 
not in the question of whether human 
rights and sustainability topics are tied 
to the substantive trade provisions of the 
agreements, but how close this connection 
should be or whether the issues can be 
addressed by other clauses. The ACP states 
should recognise that the extent to which 
human rights are respected in the partner 
countries is an important factor for accept-
ance of free trade agreements and devel-
opment cooperation within the European 
Union. The European Commission can 
demonstrate only limited flexibility on 
this point. 
 
EPA-related aid for trade should be made effective 
– even without additional means. In the Euro-
pean Union there is agreement that trade-
related development cooperation repre-
sents an important supplement to the EPA 
talks. In view of stretched EU budgets and 
unused billions in the European Develop-
ment Fund there is, however, little willing-
ness on the part of the Commission and the 
member-states to approve additional funds 
for EPA-related aid for trade. The European 
Union should nonetheless take seriously 
the ACP’s worries over adjustment costs 
and the need for flanking projects. It should 
be considered how this can be accommo-
dated. An EPA monitoring system that 
quickly identifies any adjustment burdens 
and points to response possibilities would 
also be conceivable, as would consideration 
as to how the administrative processing of 
EPA-related aid for trade procedures could 
be simplified. 
 
Take regional integration processes in southern 
Africa into account. Above all in southern 
Africa there is a tension between the EPA 
talks and regional integration processes. 
Here the European Union holds a position 
that is hard to justify. That becomes clear 
if we transpose the problem to the EU con-
text, where it is inconceivable that the 
European Union would accept a free trade 
agreement that provided special treatment 
for one member-state, for example Ger-
many. Of course the analogy is not perfect, 
firstly because the degree of integration in 
southern Africa is considerably smaller, 
and secondly because the situation is his-
torically conditioned. Trade policy towards 
the ACP already differs from trade policy 
towards South Africa since a long time. 
But the example spotlights the problem 
for further internal integration. There is 
no easy solution: the economically obvious 
option of including South Africa in zero-
tariff status is probably excluded politically 
by South Africa’s economic strength. But in 
the medium term ways must be found to 
allow regional integration to advance un-
hindered. That still applies even if an EPA 
that provides for special treatment of South 
Africa can be concluded. Finally, further 
constructive ideas should be generated. At 
the least, additional consultation and nego-
tiation mechanisms should be provided 
for the eventuality that problems arise for 
regional integration in southern Africa. 
Outlook 
Opinions differ as to whether the EPA talks 
are following a normal trajectory or in fact 
risk doing lasting harm to political relation-
ships with Africa. It is certainly nothing 
unusual for trade talks to drag on for years 
and for the participants to adopt stark posi-
tions that they sometimes present polemi-
cally or aggressively. But in relations with 
Africa it is unusual. Viable alternative 
models for keeping trade preferences with-
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 in WTO rules without an economic partner-
ship agreement are, however, not discern-
ible. In most of the ACP regions there is 
therefore still strong interest in concluding 
the talks. Political criticism of the EPAs, 
for example at earlier EU-AU summits, was 
never more than empty noise and has not 
to date led to any country or region with-
drawing from the talks. If both sides 
demonstrate willingness to compromise, 
a constructive outcome should be achiev-
able by autumn 2014. 
Germany should, preferably in coordi-
nation with other member-states, push 
actively in the EU Council working groups 
for the European Union to adopt a flexible 
position in the talks, in order to enable 
compromises along the lines sketched out 
above. 
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